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Comment
No More Times Tables: Risk Multipliers in
Attorneys' Fee Awards After In Re Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.
Peter-Christian Olivo
"The issue of attorneys' fees, from the Congress to the courts, never
rests."
Kenneth W. StarI1
Myron Gackenbach and his fellow plaintiffs commenced a
class action against Bolar Pharmaceutical Company, alleging
that Bolar and some of its officers and directors fraudulently
obtained United States Food and Drug Administration approval
to manufacture and distribute generic drugs.2 Bolar settled,
and as part of the settlement agreement created a common
fund of nearly thirty-one million dollars, part of which would
pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Lead counsel Daniel L. Berger
applied for an award of fees on behalf of the twenty-four law
firms who represented the class.3 The district court awarded
fees of $2,351,694.40, which included a 1.6 risk multiplier to ac-
count for the possibility that plaintiffs would lose, and conse-
quently, their attorneys working on a contingent fee basis
would receive nothing.4 Gackenbach contended that this risk
1. Kenneth W. Starr, The Shifting Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Awards:
The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 189, 230
(1986).
2. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Sec. Litig., 800 F. Supp. 1091, 1092
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
3. Id. A common fund is the settlement fund the defendant deposits
with the court for release of liability. See generally 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIONS § 11 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing settlement of class
actions). Under the common fund doctrine, an attorney who creates a benefit
for the members of the class is entitled to reasonable compensation from the
fund. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257
(1975) (summarizing the common fund doctrine). For a detailed explanation
of the common fund doctrine, see infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
4. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1092. The court utilized a risk enhancement fac-
tor of 1.6. Id. A risk enhancement factor is a number representing the risk of
not being paid that the attorney faces at the inception of the case. See Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,
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enhancement was improper and appealed the fee award to the
Second Circuit.5 The Court of Appeals remanded "for specific
findings" on allowing the risk enhancement multiplier, sug-
gesting that the district court might postpone consideration un-
til the Supreme Court decided a similar case involving risk
multipliers.6 The district court obliged and after the Supreme
Court's decision, subsequently reevaluated its original risk en-
hancer, reducing the fee award by $881,885.40. 7
In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. raises the issue of whether
it is appropriate to apply a risk multiplier to a common fund
case. The Bolar district court found risk multipliers to be inap-
propriate in a common fund case, thus extending the Supreme
Court's restriction on risk multipliers.8
This Comment argues that the Bolar court's rationale for
prohibiting risk multipliers in the common fund context is mis-
guided and problematic. Part I gives a brief history of attor-
neys' fees in the United States and traces the efforts of courts
to determine reasonable attorneys' fee awards. Part II details
the holding and reasoning of the Bolar district court's opinion.
Part III critiques the Bolar opinion and argues that the court
117 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy IT') ("Under the rubric of 'the contingent nature of
success' the district court should appraise the professional burden under-
taken-that is, the probability or likelihood of success, viewed at the time of
filing suit."). A risk enhancement factor of 1.6 signifies a 62.5% chance of suc-
cess (or more accurately, a 37.5% risk of losing and thus not receiving any fee).
The risk multiplier (RM) is derived by dividing one by the percent
chance of success: (1 / x%) = RM. For example, if there is a 75% chance of
success, the risk multiplier is 1.33: (1 / 75%) = 1.33. Thus, to accurately re-
flect the attorney's fair market value, a court should multiply the primary
lodestar by 1.33.
The basis for the risk enhancement is to compensate a plaintiff's attorney
for her services as an entrepreneur who bears the risks of the litigation. John
Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473,
480 (1980).
5. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Sec. Litig., 966 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir.
1992) (per curiam).
6. Id. at 733. The Second Circuit suggested that the Bolar court postpone
further evaluation until the Supreme Court decided City of Burlington v.
Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992), a statutory fee-shifting case regarding the appro-
priateness of risk multipliers. Id.
7. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., See. Litig., 800 F. Supp. 1091, 1097.
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). The court originally granted $2,351,694.40 in attorneys' fees,
of which $881,885.40 was a risk enhancement. Id. at 1092.
8. The Supreme Court restricted a risk enhancement in a statutory fee
award case, City of Burlington v. Dague, not a common fund fee award as in
Bolar. A statutory fee-shifting case is one in which Congress has explicitly
provided for the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (granting reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties).
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incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent by failing to rec-
ognize the purpose and effect of common fund fee awards, and
the fair market value of attorney services. Finally, this Com-
ment proposes better ways to use the risk multiplier to enhance
its effectiveness, to reduce the amount of litigation surrounding
its use, and ultimately to encourage attorneys to accept contin-
gent fee, common fund cases.
I. THE RISK MULTIPLIER IN ATTORNEYS'
FEE AWARDS
A. THE "AMERICAN RULE" AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The "American Rule" governs most attorneys' fee situa-
tions in the United States.9 Under this rule, each party is re-
sponsible for its own attorneys' fees, regardless of which side
prevails.'0  Due to its perceived harshness," however, there
have been a number of exceptions to the American Rule, both
9. The Supreme Court first embraced the "American Rule" in Arcambel
v. Wiseman, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The Arcambel Court ruled that the
judiciary itself would not create a general rule, absent any statute, to allow
awards of attorneys' fees in federal courts. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-61 (1975) (explaining development of the
American Rule and reaffirming its principles). See generally John Leubsdorf,
Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984) (providing a detailed historical explanation of the
American Rule and the exceptions to it).
10. On an international level, the American Rule represents the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience
With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBS. 37 (1984). In Eng-
land, for example, courts customarily award attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party. James D. Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory, Estate of
Farrar v. Cain's Improper Limit on Awards of Attorneys' Fees Under § 1988,
76 MINN. L. REv. 1251, 1253 (1992). Attorneys' fee awards under the English
system serve to ensure that the prevailing party, either plaintiff or defendant,
does not pay to vindicate just legal positions. Marshall J. Breger, Compensa-
tion Formulas For Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
249, 250 (1984).
11. Critics have argued that the "no fee shifting" system of the American
Rule penalizes less affluent plaintiffs and discourages them from bringing po-
tentially meritorious claims, thus restricting their access to the judicial pro-
cess. Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237,
246-49 (1985); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights:
The Supreme Cour Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx. L. REV. 291, 298
n.22 (1990); Starr, supra note 1, at 192 n.16 (citing articles criticizing the Amer-
ican Rule); see also Weiss, supra note 10 at 1254.
Ironically, the American Rule was designed to increase access to the
courts since, in theory, people are less hesitant to sue if they only have to pay
their own fees and not pay the other party if they lose. See Fleischmann Dis-
tilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
judicial and legislative. Two of the most prominent exceptions
are the common fund doctrine and the fee-shifting statute.12
The first major exception to the American Rule, the com-
mon fund doctrine, developed from the law of class actions.13
In a class action, an individual brings suit on behalf of a large
group of similarly situated individuals who cannot be practi-
cally joined.14 In most class actions, the defendant makes a set-
tlement payment to the court directly, rather than to each
member of the class, in exchange for a release from further lia-
bility.15 These payments constitute the "common fund.' 16
The Supreme Court first established the common fund doc-
trine in 1881.17 Under the doctrine, a person who preserves, re-
covers, or acts as a trustee of a fund for the benefit of others
may recover attorneys' fees either from the fund directly or
from the other parties enjoying the benefit.' 8 This doctrine de-
12. While the common fund doctrine and the fee-shifting statute are the
two most widely used exceptions to the American Rule, courts have fashioned
other exceptions as well. For example, courts may assess attorneys' fees for
the willful disobedience of a court order. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258; see also
Leubsdorf, supra note 9, at 26 (discussing fee awards as punishment for some
illegal acts). Another example occurs when the losing party has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at
258-59; see also Weiss, supra note 10, at 1255 n.24 (listing recent cases in which
courts have awarded fees based on the "bad-faith" exception). Courts have
also upheld recovery of attorney fees pursuant to a fee clause in a contract,
Leubsdorf, supra note 9, at 24, and awarded fees under the "private attorney
general" theory to grant fees to individuals initiating litigation that vindicates
important public policies. Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 241.
Courts have also granted fees under the common benefit doctrine, which is
similar to the common fund doctrine except that it creates a substantive right
rather than a monetary fund. Starr, supra note 1, at 194.
13. See 3 NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 14.01 ("Fee awards unique to class ac-
tions.., are fees that are awarded under the common fund theory.")
14. See 1 id. § 1.01.
15. See 2 id. § 11.11 (stating that one of the reasons for a defendant set-
tling a class action is to buy peace from the litigation).
16. Id.
17. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881). The Supreme Court further developed the common fund doctrine
in Central R.R. & Bank Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885). For a comprehen-
sive explanation of the development of the common fund doctrine, see John P.
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1601-12 (1974).
18. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58
(1975) (summarizing the rule set forth in Greenough and listing cases which
have followed the common fund doctrine); see also In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (1992) ("Having employed their professional skills to
create a cornucopia for the class, the lawyers for the class were entitled under
the principles of restitution to suitable compensation for their efforts.").
The common fund doctrine is an exception to the American Rule because
[Vol. 77:893
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rives from the inherent equity power of the courts,19 and "rests
on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a law-
suit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the
successful litigant's expense. '20 Because the court has jurisdic-
tion over the common fund, it prevents such inequity by paying
the attorneys' fees out of the fund, "thus spreading fees propor-
tionately among those benefited by the suit."'21
The other major exception to the American Rule is the fee-
shifting statute. Two closely related types of statutes fall under
this rubric: those which explicitly award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party,22 and those which lack a fee-shifting provision
but under which courts have nonetheless awarded fees based
on the "private attorney general" theory.23 According to this
theory, courts grant fee awards to individuals initiating litiga-
tion to vindicate important public policies. -4 Courts easily jus-
tify granting attorneys' fees under the private attorney general
it allows the named plaintiff to wholly avoid paying his attorneys' fees, thus
spreading the cost of bringing the litigation equally among the class benefitted.
Starr, supra note 1, at 194.
19. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257.
20. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). At least one com-
mentator has suggested that an attorney is entitled to a fee because class mem-
bers are enriched at that lawyer's expense. Charles Silver, A Restitutionary
Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 656, 662 (1991)
(emphasis added). Professor Silver argues that the common fund context es-
sentially forces absent plaintiffs both to accept the benefits the fund generates
and to pay the accompanying attorneys' fees. Id. at 663. Under a pure restitu-
tionary theory, the absent plaintiffs need not participate because the theory
disfavors forced exchanges. Id. at 664. Professor Silver continues, however,
that restitution as interpreted in the United States encompasses the moral no-
tion that one who enjoys the benefit of another's work without acquiring a
right of enjoyment ought to pay compensation sufficient either to disgorge the
gain or to ensure the producer against a loss. Id. at 666.
21. Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478; see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257.
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
23. Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 241. The "private attorney
general" theory originally held that Congress could enact a statute conferring
authority on any non-official person to bring suit to vindicate a public interest.
Starr, supra note 1, at 194 n.30 (quoting Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)). This judicially constructed theory eventually extended
to situations which lacked express statutory authority, ultimately applying to
any situation where fee shifting was necessary to permit meaningful enforce-
ment of protected rights. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 666 (1974).
24. Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 241. In order to qualify for
fees under the private attorney general theory, the litigation must, "[vindicate]
a right that (1) benefits a large number of people, (2) [requires] private en-
forcement, and (3) [is] of societal importance." Note, Important Rights and the
Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1929 (1985).
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theory for suits brought under civil rights statutes which lack
fee-shifting provisions,25 and have extended the theory to other
areas as well.
26
B. EFFORTS TO DETERMINE "REASONABLE FEES": A STATE OF
CONFUSION
"A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major
litigation."
Justice Powell 27
25. Weiss, supra note 10, at 1255; see also id. at 1255 n.26 (listing civil
rights cases where the court used the private attorney general theory to award
attorney fees absent statutory authority).
26. Comment, supra note 23, at 667; see, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
The Supreme Court temporarily eliminated the use of the private attor-
ney general theory, however, with its decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska, the court of appeals
awarded attorneys' fees based on the private attorney general theory, finding
that, inter alia, the Wilderness Society had acted to vindicate important statu-
tory rights of all citizens, and a failure to grant fees would deter private par-
ties from enforcing the laws protecting the environment. Id. at 245-46. The
Supreme Court, while simultaneously reaffirming the American Rule, limited
the granting of fees to situations where Congress explicitly indicated fee shift-
ing was appropriate. Id. at 269. Justice White believed that it would b diffi-
cult "for courts, without legislative guidance, to consider some statutes
important and others unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connec-
tion with the former." Id. at 263-64. Although Alyeska involved an environ-
mental statute, the Court extended its holding to all statutes lacking an
express fee-shifting provision. Id. at 269 n.44. When interpreting fee shifting
statutes, the Court has looked at the legislative history of the The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1992)) for guidance. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
713 n.1 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n awarding attorney's fees under [the
Clean Air Act] the courts should follow the principles and case law governing
the award of such fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.").
In direct response to the Alyeska decision, Congress enacted The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1992). See S. REP. No.
1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909
("The purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil
rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society... ."). In the Act, Con-
gress adopted the private attorney general theory for civil rights litigation, id.
at 5913, and through the statute, permitted courts in such cases to use their
discretion and provide reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. Id. at
5909-10. Congress intended the fees awarded under the Act to be "adequate to
attract competent counsel" but not so exorbitant as to "produce windfalls to
attorneys." Id. at 5913. The Senate Report further states that "[i]n computing
the fee, counsel for the prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with
attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time reasonably ex-
pended on a matter.'" Id.
27. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Justice Powell contin-
ued, "Ideally, of course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee." Id. In prac-
[Vol. 77:893
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In both the common fund and statutory fee-shifting con-
texts, the court strives to award "reasonable" attorneys' fees.28
Like its distant cousin, the reasonable person, 9 the reasonable
attorneys' fee has been the subject of a tremendous amount of
litigation.30 A "reasonable" fee should, in theory, compensate
an attorney for the full market value of her time and effort.31
Over the years, courts developed several methods to deter-
mine reasonable fees. Prior to the early 1970s, for example,
"the most common approach taken by the lower courts in set-
ting fees was no approach at all."32 When awarding attorneys'
fees under fee-shifting statutes, courts often determined a rea-
sonable fee based on their own whim, without any reliance on
objective factors or recognizable methodology for this
determination.33
In contrast, under the common fund doctrine, courts his-
tice, however, requests for attorneys' fees often result in collateral litigation.
In 1992, for example, 10l cases in the federal courts dealt with attorneys' fee
awards. LEXIS (Genfed Library, Courts File, query (award! /5 attorney! /2
fee and "common fund" or "equitable fund" or "fee shifting statute" and date
aft 1/1/92)).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) ('"The court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party... a reasonable attorney'sfee as part of the costs.") (emphasis
added). Similarly, under the common fund doctrine, the attorney who recov-
ers a common fund for the benefit of others "is entitled to a reasonable attor-
ney's fee from the fund as a whole." Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,
478 (1980) (emphasis added).
29. Justice Carlin once called the "ordinary man" the "problem child of
the law." Cordas v. Peerless Trans. Co., 27 N.Y.S. 2d 198, 199 (1941). The "or-
dinary man" is synonymous with the "reasonable man." See WULIAM L. PROS-
SER ET AL., ToRTS 149-74 (8th ed. 1988).
30. See supra note 27 (listing the approximate number of cases in 1992
dealing with the award of attorneys' fees).
31. Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reason-
able?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281, 315-16 (1977). Berger states that the fair market
value should govern regardless of whether the court proceeds under its equity
power in a common fund case or pursuant to statutory authorization. Id.; see
also In re Continental f1. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The ob-
ject in awarding a reasonable attorney's fee ... is to give the lawyer what he
would have gotten in the way of a fee in an arm's length negotiation, had one
been feasible.").
32. See Berger, supra note 31, at 284. Berger cites Canterbury v. Dick, 385
F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1973) as an example of this lack of an approach. In
Dick, the court, acting under a fee-shifting statute, simply stated, "[t]hat the
court finds that $2,750.00 is a fair and reasonable attorney's fee for legal serv-
ices rendered to and for Plaintiffs by their counsel in this suit," with no rea-
sons behind this determination. Berger, supra note 31, at 284 (quoting Dick,
385 F. Supp. at 1009).
33. See Berger, supra note 31, at 284 (citing an example of a random fee
determination).
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torically awarded fees based on a percentage of the total recov-
ery of the fund.34 While this method appeared to be more
consistent than the random determinations under fee-shifting
statutes, various courts' determinations of what constituted an
appropriate percentage of the fund remained inconsistent.s In
fact, high percentages, coupled with the large size of the com-
mon funds, created a public impression that such fee arrange-
ments produced windfalls to attorneys.36
Concerned that the legal profession's reputation might suf-
fer in light of courts' haphazard determinations of fee awards,
the Third Circuit advocated a system mandating that fee
awards be based on time spent and skill displayed, and that fee
determinations reflect this approach in a clear, cognizable man-
ner.37 The Third Circuit developed such a system, known as
the lodestar, in Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator &
Sanitary Corp.38
To establish the lodestar, the Lindy court determined the
reasonable number of hours expended by the attorney and mul-
tiplied that by the "reasonable hourly rate," usually the attor-
ney's normal billing rate.39  This calculation produced a
primary "lodestar" figure.40 Then, to determine the ultimate
34. See, e.g., Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128
(1885). In one of the earliest common fund doctrine decisions, the Supreme
Court granted a fee of 5% of the total fund recovered for the plaintiffs. Id.
35. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 31, at 288 (citing 18 private antitrust cases
with fee awards ranging from 5% to 67%); HERBERT B. NEWBERG, ATTORNEY
FEE AWARDS § 2.31 (listing common fund fee awards ranging from 2.2% to
53.2% of total fund); In re Workers Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 771 F. Supp.
284, 287 n.7 (D. Minn. 1991) (listing common fund cases with fee awards from
15% to 27%).
36. See Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney's Fees in Common Fund Ac-
tions, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 845 (1991).
37. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy r') (citing Judge Wyzanski's observations in
Cherner v. Transition Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963)).
38. Id. at 167. The court stated that the purpose of the award was to com-
pensate the attorney for the reasonable value of services benefitting the un-
represented claimant. Id.
39. Id. The attorney's normal billing rate reflects the value of the attor-
ney's time, which usually reflects the attorney's reputation and status. Id.
40. Id. at 168. Although in theory this may appear to be a simple formula,
in practice it is very problematic. It is difficult to determine what constitutes a
reasonable number of hours and what is the proper hourly rate. See, e.g., Ed-
ward D. Cavanagh, Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the Sys-
tem Fairer, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 51, 80-83 (1988) (examining the problems
of billing rates and what is a reasonable number of hours for the attorney to
expend); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation" Economic Analysis and Rec-
Vol. 77:893
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value of the attorney's services, the Lindy I court modified the
lodestar figure by two other factors.41 The court first looked at
the "contingent nature of success" and then considered the
quality of the attorney's work.42 The contingency factor ad-
dressed the risk the attorney bore in accepting the case given
that, under a contingent fee arrangement, the attorney would
not receive a fee unless she prevailed.43 The quality of the at-
torney's work encompassed not only the quality of representa-
tion the judge observed, but also the "complexity and novelty
of the issues" and the size of the recovery."4
The following year, the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express,45 designed another alternative to the "no ap-
proach" method, which shares many characteristics with the
lodestar method. The court set forth twelve factors to consider
when determining a reasonable fee.4 6 Even with the various
methods developed to determine reasonable fees, courts have
ommendations for Reform, 58 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991) (noting that the
lodestar system permits attorney opportunism by encouraging attorneys to
work excessive hours, pad the bill, or to advise against settlement irrespective
of the client's interest.); Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a
New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEx. L. REV. 865, 953-54 (1992) (noting that "dis-
agreements over hours figure in most cases" in which parties litigate fees); La-
pointe, supra note 36, at 848-57 (explaining the problem of hours and rates and
offering some judicial responses to these problems).
41. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168.
42. Id&
43. IA.; see Berger, supra note 31, at 324-26; Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at
473.
44. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168.
45. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. The twelve factors are:
(1) The time and labor required.
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to ac-
ceptance of the case.
(5) The customary fee.
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
(10) The "undesirability" of the case.
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(12) Awards in similar cases.
Id. The court based these factors on the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDucr Rule 1.5 (1991). Id. at 719; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Reducing Attor-
neys'Fees for Partial Success: A Comment on Hensley and Blum, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 835, 866.
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yet to generate a consensus as to which method is most appro-
priate in the common fund context.
C. REASONABLE FEES AND THE SUPREME COURT: WHnTLiNG
AWAY AT JOHNSON
The Supreme Court has recently given its imprimatur to
the primary lodestar calculation in statutory cases, calling it
"the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence."4 7  The
Court has been much less definitive, however, about whether
the primary lodestar figure should be modified as mandated in
the second part of the Lindy I analysis or according to the sub-
jective factors test of Johnson." In fact, for many years, the
Supreme Court advocated the use of a hybrid method of deter-
mining the fee award, incorporating the Lindy I lodestar calcu-
lation and modifying it based on the Johnson factors.49
1. Hensley and Blum: Eliminating Nine Johnson Factors
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,50 for example, the Court initially
recognized that "[t]he most useful starting point for determin-
ing the amount of a reasonable fee" is the primary lodestar fig-
ure.51 It then stated that "other considerations," namely the
Johnson factors, may allow the district court to modify the
lodestar figure.5 2
The Court revisited the modification issue in Blum v. Sten-
47. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992).
48. One commentator described the Court's progress in this area as a "tor-
tuous road" and noted that "no single issue in the law of statutory attorney's
fees has created more confusion for courts than the question of how and when
to adjust the lodestar." Brand, supra note 11, at 335.
49. See Arthur J. Lachman, Note, Attorney's Fee Contingency Enhance-
ments: Toward a Complete Incentive to Litigate Under Federal Fee-Shifting
Statutes-Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 63
WASH. L. REv. 469, 472 (1988) (describing the Court's use of the hybrid ap-
proach). This hybrid approach differs from the hybrid approach commonly
used today. Under the current approach, a court calculates the enhanced lode-
star and compares it to the percentage of recovery. For an example of this
method, see infra note 127.
50. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
51. Id. at 432. The Court did not use the term "lodestar" when describing
what was essentially the primary lodestar calculation until its plurality deci-
sion in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568 (1986) (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, and noting that this figure is "commonly referred
to as the 'lodestar' "). Justice Powell, concurring in Delta Air Lines v. August,
450 U.S. 346, 365 n.3 (1981), cited to the Lindy II use of the term, thus marking
the first time the Supreme Court utilized the term to describe the calculation
of attorneys' fees.
52. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 & n.9 (citing to the factors listed in John-
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son,53 holding that, for a district court to grant an upward ad-
justment of the primary lodestar, the fee applicant must show
that "such an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a
reasonable fee."' 4 Although Blum clearly established that the
primary lodestar was the center of the reasonable fee inquiry, it
still left issues regarding the availability of certain lodestar en-
hancements unresolved.-s
In effect, the Blum and Hensley decisions eliminated all
but three of the twelve Johnson factors as appropriate factors
to enhance the primary lodestar in statutory fee-shifting
cases.56 These remaining factors all related to the contingent
nature of the case, or in other words, the risk the plaintiffs' at-
son v. Georgia Highway Express 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) as permis-
sible for district court consideration).
Although the Court recognized that the primary lodestar calculation nec-
essarily subsumes some of the Johnson factors, it failed to identify which fac-
tors. See id. The Hensley Court placed heavy emphasis, however, on the
"results obtained" factor of the Johnson test, see supr note 46 (factor number
8), stating that the amount of success is crucial to determining the proper fee
award. Id at 434.
53. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
54. I& at 898. In Blum, the plaintiffs' attorney requested, and the district
court granted, an upward enhancement of 50% based, in part, on the complex-
ity and novelty of the issues. Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The Supreme Court found that the number of hours billed presumably
fully reflects the complexity and novelty of the issues factor. Blum, 465 U.S.
at 898. The Court recognized that the special skill of the attorney may require
the expenditure of fewer hours on more complex issues. It decided, however,
that such skill is taken into account in a higher hourly billing rate. Id, The
Blum decision thereby eliminated three of the Johnson factors as a basis for
modifying the primary lodestar figure, namely, (2) the novelty and complexity
of the issues, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, and
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys. Id. at 898-99.
55. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99.
56. The Court subsumed factors (1) (the time and labor required) and (5)
(the customary fee) in the primary lodestar; eliminated (2) (the novelty and
difficulty of the questions), (3) (the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly), and (9) (the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys) in
Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-907; the Court in Hensley accepted (8) (the amount in-
volved and the results obtained) as a valid basis for decreased enhancement of
the lodestar figure. 461 U.S. at 436. A strong argument can be made that fac-
tors (7) (time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances), (11) (the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client), and (12)
(awards in similar cases) are also unavailable as a basis for enhancing the lode-
star. The Johnson court described factor (7) as priority work that delays other
work and noted that "[t]his factor is particularly important when a new coun-
sel is called in." 488 F.2d at 718. A court would presumably address this factor
in hours the extra attorney worked multiplied by her hourly rate. Factor (11)
refers to an attorney varying her fee for a certain client. Id- at 719. This
would be accounted for in the reasonable rate charged. Moreover, factor (12)
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torney incurs by accepting the case.57
2. City of Burlington: The Contingency Factor in Fee-
Shifting Statutes
The Court addressed the risk multiplier issue in City of
Burlington v. Dague.5 8 In City of Burlington, the Court held
is foreclosed as soon as the court elects to use the lodestar because the calcula-
tion is unique to each case.
Only factors (4) (the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to ac-
ceptance of the case), (6) (whether the fee is fixed or contingent), and (10)
(the "undesirability" of the case) remain after Blum and Hensley. At least as
far as factor (4) is concerned, the relevant inquiry should be only the preclu-
sion of other employment due to potential conflicts inherent with the accepted
case, not lost employment for which the attorney has no time.
In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1989), the Supreme Court
found that the lodestar could be enhanced for a delay in payment of the attor-
neys' fees, reasoning that attorneys must meet their business expenses and
that enhancing the lodestar for delay is consistent with the § 1988 command of
awarding reasonable attorneys' fees.
57. See supra note 4 (providing a detailed description of enhancement
based on the contingency factor). The Supreme Court addressed the contin-
gency issue in the Delaware Valley cases (Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) ("Delaware Valley T') and
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711
(1987) ("Delaware Valley IP')), but was unable to determine whether risk of
nonpayment could be used as a basis for a lodestar enhancement.
The Delaware Valley cases involved a citizens' council request for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle emission inspection
and maintenance program pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1416
(E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
478 U.S. 546 (1986). The citizens' council succeeded in implementing the emis-
sion inspection program and requested attorneys' fees as allowed under the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988)). The district court granted the re-
quest and used a risk multiplier to enhance the lodestar, 581 F. Supp. at 1418-
31, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 762 F.2d at 280-82.
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's use of the lodestar calcula-
tion; it reversed, however, the district court's enhancement for the quality of
the counsel's performance and requested reargument on the appropriateness
of the lodestar enhancement based on contingency. Delaware Valley I, 478
U.S. at 566-68. After rehearing, no majority of justices could agree to the ap-
propriateness of contingency enhancements to the lodestar. Delaware Valley
II, 483 U.S. 711, 728-31 (1987) (plurality opinion). Instead, in a plurality opin-
ion, the Court decided that in the case at bar the use of a risk multiplier was
in error. Id The Court could not agree, however, as to the use of contingency
enhancements in future fee determinations. Id.
For a more in-depth analysis of the Delaware Valley cases, see Lachman,
supra note 49, at 475-80.
58. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). In City of Burlington, property owners brought
an action under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6972 (e) (1988)) and
the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1365 (d) (1988)), alleging that the city of Bur-
lington, Vermont operated a landfill in violation of the statutes. Id. at 2639.
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that courts may not enhance a fee award under the federal fee-
shifting statutes.59 The Court believed that allowing risk en-
hancements in statutory fee-shifting cases in effect pays for the
attorney's time in cases that she loses,60 is unnecessary to the
determination of a reasonable fee inherent in the lodestar anal-
ysis, and makes the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary,
hence more litigable.6' Moreover, City of Burlington signalled
the end of upward enhancements based on the Johnson factors
in statutory fee-shifting cases.6 2 Absent any extenuating cir-
cumstances, the Court presumes the lodestar calculation with-
out enhancement to be the reasonable fee that Congress
intended under the Fees Act.63
In addressing the issue of reasonable fees, the Supreme
Court dealt only with statutory fee-shifting cases and not the
awarding of attorneys' fees under the common fund doctrine.6
In fact, the Court, in deciding the aforementioned cases, noted
a distinct difference between fee-shifting statutes and the com-
mon fund doctrine65 and has yet to address whether its statu-
The property owners prevailed, and the district court awarded attorneys' fees
under the Acts, multiplying the lodestar amount by 25% to account for the
contingent nature of the action. Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458,
472 (D. Vt. 1989), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1343, 1347 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 112 S.
Ct. 2638 (1992). The Second Circuit affirmed the award, 935 F.2d 1343, 1359-60
(2d Cir. 1991), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address only the
propriety of the contingency enhancement. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S.
Ct. 964 (1992).
59. City of Burlington, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
60. Id at 2643. The Court found that Congress did not intend the losing
parties' attorneys to be paid since the Fees Act only provided for attorneys'
fees to the prevailing parties. See id The Court noted that "[a]n attorney op-
erating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks presented by his various
cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time he gambled on
those that did not." Id
61. Id.
62. Under the analysis set forth in note 63, supra, all that remains from
the Johnson factors as a basis for modifying the primary lodestar figure is fac-
tor (8) (results obtained), which the Court upheld in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
63. City of Burlington, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. The Court has "established a
'strong presumption' that the lodestar represents the 'reasonable' fee [quoting
Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)], and [has] placed upon the fee ap-
plicant who seeks more than that the burden of showing that 'such an adjust-
ment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee' [quoting Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984)]." Id. at 2641.
64. See id. at 2643-44. The Court held "that enhancement for contingency
is not permitted under the fee-shifting statutes at issue." Id- (emphasis
added).
65. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984). The Court
statew'L
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tory fee jurisprudence governs the common fund doctrine. 66
This silence raises serious questions as to the appropriateness of
applying fee-shifting jurisprudence to the common fund
context.
II. IN RE BOLAR PHARMACEUTICAL CO.: APPLYING
STATUTORY FEE-SHIFTING LAW TO THE
COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
Unhappy with the federal district court's assessment of a
1.6 risk enhancement factor, class member Myron Gackenbach
appealed6 7 the order awarding the class attorneys their fees.
68
Gackenbach contended that the trial court abused its discretion
by multiplying the lodestar figure by 1.6 to account for the risk
inherent in litigating the suit.69 The Second Circuit remanded
Nor do we believe that the number of persons benefited is a consider-
ation of significance in calculating fees under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988. Un-
like the calculation of attorney's fees under the "common fund
doctrine," where a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund
bestowed on the class, a reasonable fee under § 1988 reflects the
amount of attorney time reasonably expended on the litigation.
Id (second emphasis added).
66. Courts have generally concluded that the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence regarding statutory fee-shifting cases is not applicable to the common
fund doctrine. See, e.g., Camden I Condominium Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d
768, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that Delaware Valley, a statutory fee-shift-
ing case, "is not applicable to a common fund case"); County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1327 (2d Cir. 1990) ("In our view, fee-
shifting statutes are generally not intended to circumscribe the operation of
the equitable fund doctrine."); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 226, 234 n.2 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Blum and Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
are statutory fee cases whereas here fees were awarded under the equitable
fund doctrine. While the lodestar formula applies to both types of cases, equi-
table fund cases may afford courts more leeway in enhancing the lodestar,
given the absence of any legislative directive.").
67. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec. Litig., 966 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir.
1992) (per curiam). Gackenbach also appealed the district court's refusal to
certify him as a special master to handle the disbursement of the common
fund and the district court's granting of $40,000 in fees to the law firm of Ab-
bey & Ellis. Id.
68. Plaintiff's attorney Daniel L. Berger was initially awarded the sum of
$2,351,694.40 for attorneys' fees on behalf of all the plaintiffs' attorneys. Id.
This figure represented approximately 8.5% of the approximately $31 million
settlement fund. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec. Litig., 800 F. Supp. 1091,
1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The court paid attorneys at a maximum rate of $300 per
hour and paralegals at a maximum rate of $60 per hour. Id. The combined
hours were 7,846.3, which resulted in a lodestar calculation of $1,465,809.00. Id.
This was multiplied by the 1.6 risk enhancement factor for a total fee award of
$2,351,694.40. Id.
69. Bolar, 966 F.2d at 732. During the settlement hearing, Berger, on be-
half of the firms representing the class, applied for an award of 25% of the
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"for specific findings and a reasoned explanation," for allowing
a risk enhancement multiplier.70 The Court of Appeals further
suggested that the district court might wish to postpone consid-
eration of Bolar until the Supreme Court decided City of Bur-
lington v. Dague,7 1 so it could benefit from the Court's
guidance on a similar issue.72
At the outset of its analysis, the Bolar district court on re-
mand recognized that the Second Circuit typically allowed
"risk multipliers in common fund cases handled on a contin-
gency basis."7 3  Because the Supreme Court had recently ad-
dressed the risk multiplier issue74, however, the Bolar court
felt compelled to reexamine its prior risk multiplier of 1.6. 75
The district court looked at the steady trend of Supreme Court
restrictions on fee enhancements in statutory fee-shifting
cases76 and ultimately determined that the Court's rationale
underlying the ban on contingency enhancements in statutory
fee-shifting cases extended to equitable fund cases.77
Although the Bolar district court relied heavily on Second
Circuit language suggesting similarities between common fund
and statutory fee-shifting cases7 8 and on a similar decision by
another lower court,7 9 four factors ultimately persuaded the
court to rescind its use of the risk multiplier in the equitable
settlement fund. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1092. The court rejected the percent-
age request and instead elected to use the lodestar method. Id. at 1095-97.
70. Bokir, 966 F.2d at 733.
71. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
72. Bolar, 966 F.2d at 733.
73. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1093. The district court explained that
[i]n order to ensure adequate representation to plaintiffs bringing
suits that promote a desirable public policy, yet do not offer promise
of great financial gain, risk multipliers were granted to "reward[ ]
counsel for those successful cases in which the probability of success
was slight, and yet the time invested in the case was substantial."
Id. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Agent Orange Ii") (citation omitted).
74. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
75. See supra note 4.
76. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1094-95.
77. I& at 1095-96. In doing so, the Bolar court recognized that the
Supreme Court has failed to address the applicability of its statutory fee-shift-
ing jurisprudence to the common fund doctrine and expressly rejected a
number of other courts' opinions that found that statutory fee-shifting law was
not binding on the common fund doctrine. Id at 1095 & n.6.
78. The court referred to the language of the Second Circuit in Agent Or-
ange II, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987), yet failed to indicate exactly what that
court said. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
79. The Bolar court cited Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 129
F.R.D. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), stating that it was adopting the Kronfeld philoso-
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fund context.8 0 First, the Bolar court concluded that applying
the City of Burlington rationale to the common fund context
did not defeat the purpose of the common fund doctrine.81 The
court believed that the attorney receives reasonable compensa-
tion for her work based on the primary lodestar calculation,
without need for a risk multiplier.8 2
The Bolar district court next examined the assertion that
because plaintiffs' counsel accepted the case on a contingency
basis, he was entitled to a risk multiplier.8 3 Based on its inter-
pretation of City of Burlington, the court concluded that
awarding a risk multiplier on account of contingency would
provide counsel with a windfall because "the difficulty of the
litigation is taken into account in the billable hours and fee
rates used to calculate the lodestar figure."' 4
Third, the Bolar district court analyzed the plaintiffs' coun-
sel's contention that even if the class prevailed, the class may
have difficulty collecting the judgments 5 The court rejected
this argument based on the Supreme Court's decision in Mis-
souri v. Jenkins,8 6 which held that the risk of nonpayment is
no basis for awarding a fee multiplier.8 7
Finally, as if still uncertain, the Bolar district court looked
at Justice O'Connor's risk multiplier test88 that a fee enhance-
phy of applying tenets set forth in fee-shifting cases to the equitable fund con-
text. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1096.
80. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1096. The Bolar court used the term "equitable
fund," which is identical to a common fund, to describe the fund the class ac-
tion suit created.
81. Id. Again, following the language of the Second Circuit, the court
found that "[t]he underlying rationale for the doctrine is the belief that an at-
torney who creates a fund for the benefit of a class should receive reasonable
compensation from the fund for his efforts." Id (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 222
(2d Cir. 1987) ("Agent Orange '), cert denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987)).
82. Id.
83. I& at 1097.
84. IM The court concluded that because of this, enhancement of the con-
tingency factor is unnecessary. IM
85. Id,
86. 491 U.S. 274, 282 (1989). The Jenkins Court cited to its dicta in Dela-
ware Valley I, 483 U.S. 711, 729-30 (1987), stating that a court could base fee
enhancement on risk of nonpayment but not on delay. Id, Nowhere did the
Bolar court make this distinction, nor does it appear the court considered an
enhancement based on the delay that might occur in collecting a judgment.
87. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1097.
88. This test was put forth by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Del-
aware Valley I, 483 U.S. at 733, and rejected by the Court in City of Burling-
ton v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2642 (1992).
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ment is appropriate if necessary to attract competent counsel.8 9
Even under this position, which the Bolar court noted the
Supreme Court had specifically rejected, the court concluded
that a risk multiplier was still inappropriate because "[d]ozens
of New York City's top firms vied for the opportunity to repre-
sent the instant class."90 Consequently, as a result of these fac-
tors, the court rescinded its initial 1.6 risk multiplier,
eliminating $885,885.40 from the attorneys' fee award.9 1
III. IN RE BOLAR PHARMACEUTICAL CO.: THE
COURT'S UNWARRANTED LEAP
A. BOLAR'S FATAL FLAW: DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FEE
AWARDS UNDER FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES AND THE
COMMON FUND DOCTRiNE
Although the Bolar court recognized that fee awards under
the fee-shifting statutes differ from fee awards under the com-
mon fund doctrine, 92 it ignored those differences in concluding
that the overriding purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is identi-
cal to the purpose of the equitable fund doctrine.93 The basic
distinctions between the awarding of attorneys' fees under the
common fund doctrine and fee-shifting statutes are the under-
lying purpose of each award, which party ultimately bears the
burden of attorneys' fees, and the conflict of interest between
the plaintiff and her attorney. These distinctions, overlooked
in Bolar, make clear that while risk multipliers are inappropri-
ate under fee-shifting statutes, they are suitable under the com-
mon fund doctrine.
1. The Underlying Purpose of Each Award: Risk Multipliers,
Equity, and Congressional Intent
Although attorneys' fee awards under the common fund
doctrine and fee-shifting statutues are similar in that in both
89. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1097.
90. Id.
91. The court initially granted a primary lodestar of $1,465,809.00 and a
risk enhancement of $885,885.40, for an original fee award of $2,351,694.40. Id.
at 1092. After the Bolar court reevaluated its position, the fee award was re-
duced to $1,465,809.00. I&
92. See Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1096, n.7 (noting that "[s]ome courts have
decided that the different rationales behind the [common] fund doctrine and
statutory fee-shift[ing] preclude application of statutory fee-shift cases to equi-
table fund scenarios").
93. See i& (recognizing that "[a]lthough these arguments have some
merit, the overriding purpose [of the two scenarios] is identical").
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instances, attorneys' fees are contingent upon a successful reso-
lution of the case, the court's authority to award fees and the
underlying purpose of each award differs materially.
The award of fees under the common fund doctrine rests
on the equity power of courts and is analogous to an action in
quantum meruit.9 Under the common fund doctrine, the at-
torney's efforts have conferred a benefit on the entire class.
Accordingly, to prevent unjust enrichment of the absent plain-
tiffs, the common fund doctrine requires that courts award at-
torneys' fees directly from the fund to distribute uniformly the
costs of the litigation among the class members. Statutory fee-
shifting provisions, in contrast, reflect Congress's intent "to en-
courage private enforcement of the statutory substantive rights,
be they economic or noneconomic, through the judicial pro-
cess." 95 The fee-shifting statutes encourage "private enforce-
ment" by awarding the prevailing party attorneys' fees from
the defendant for violation of a statutory or constitutional
right.9 6
Similarily, awarding risk enhancements under fee-shifting
statutes contradicts the express intent of Congress to award
fees only to the prevailing parties.97 A basic premise of the risk
multiplier is to compensate for the chance of nonrecovery. At-
torneys who operate on a contingency-fee basis pool the risks of
their various cases so that successful cases, in effect, pay for the
time spent on those cases that produce no fee.9 8 Hence, award-
ing risk multipliers in statutory cases rewards attorneys for
those suits in which they failed to prevail, directly thwarts con-
gressional intent, and makes risk multipliers inappropriate in
94. See Lindy I, 487 F.2d. 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973). The Lindy I court drew
the quantum meruit analogy and stated that "the individual seeking compen-
sation has, by his actions, benefited another and seeks payment for the value
of the service performed." Id.; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1975); Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860
F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
95. Skelton, 860 F.2d at 253 (quoting Third Circuit Task Force, supra note
11, at 247).
96. See Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988) ("statutory fees are intended to further a legislative
purpose by punishing the nonprevailing party and encouraging private parties
to enforce substantive rights"). See generally NEWBERG, supra note 35, § 2.06;
Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 250-51 (outlining differences be-
tween statutory fee cases and common fund cases).
97. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
5909.
98. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643 (1992).
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the fee-shifting cases.9 9 By contrast, because the common fund
doctrine is judicially, rather than legislatively created, courts
are not statutorily prohibited from subsidizing unsuccessful
suits with risk multipliers.
2. The Burden of the Attorneys' Fees
Another significant difference between the common fund
and statutory fee-shifting contexts stems from who ultimately
bears the burden of compensating the attorneys. Under the
common fund doctrine, the court assesses attorneys' fees di-
rectly from the fund, decreasing the size of the plaintiffs' ulti-
mate award. The burden of paying the attorneys' fees thus
falls on the plaintiffs' class, rather than on the defendant's, be-
cause the deposit of the settlement fund with the court limits
the. defendant's liability. 10 0 By contrast, fee-shifting statutes
place the burden of paying attorneys' fees on the defendant.
Consequently, fee-shifting statutes are intrinsically punitive.10 1
99. See supra note 60 (explaining why a risk multiplier in statutory fee
cases is contrary to congressional intent); see also Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S.
711, 719 (1987); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir.
1984); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 490.
100. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989). The Skelton court likened this fee payment
process to the way a plaintiff's attorney is paid in a contingent fee arrange-
ment. In both cases, plaintiffs must share their recovery with the attorney.
Id. Under the common fund doctrine, however, the court and not a private
agreement control the distribution of reasonable fees. See also In re Continen-
tel Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1992) (stressing that in a class ac-
tion suit, the judge, not the relevant market, must dictate the attorney's
compensation).
101. Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988). Because the risk multiplier reflects the percentage
of the likelihood of non-recovery at the time the attorney accepted the suit, see
Lindy II, 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976), assessing a risk multiplier in statu-
tory fee cases penalizes the defendant for having a stronger case, because the
stronger his case, the greater the risk that the plaintiff will not prevail, and
the higher the risk multiplier. If the plaintiff's chance of prevailing in a civil
rights lawsuit is 25%, the defendant's chance of losing is 25%. If the plaintiff
prevails and the court awards a risk multiplier to reflect the 75% risk of not
prevailing, the defendant pays more than if he would have had a greater
chance of losing at the time the attorney accepted the suit. This anomaly
could result in the defendant not zealously litigating his defense, fearing the
added penalty incumbent with a stronger case. See, e.g., Skelton, 860 F.2d at
253 (expressing concern that awarding risk multipliers in statutory fee cases
may inequitably burden defendants by penalizing those with the strongest de-
fenses); see also Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 719 (1987) ("ITihe contin-
gency factor [in fee-shifting statutes] penalizes the losing parties with the
strongest and most reasonable defenses, thus 'creating a perverse penalty for
those least culpable.' ") (quoting Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 26
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3. A Conflict of Interest
A third difference between the common fund and statutory
fee-shifting contexts which the Bolar court failed to recognize
pertains to the conflict of interest between the plaintiff's attor-
ney and the plaintiff in statutory fee cases.102 The award of a
risk multiplier reflects the risk of not prevailing at the time the
attorney accepted the suit; in a statutory fee case, the defendant
reimburses the prevailing plaintiff's attorney's fees. Conse-
quently, awarding risk multipliers may create a conflict of in-
terest because the plaintiff's attorney must reveal the
weaknesses of her case relative to the strengths of the defend-
ant's to receive a higher multiplier.10 3 This conflict is most
prevalent when the court awards attorneys' fees prior to the fi-
nal disposition of the case, or when one of the parties appeals
the merits of the case. In these instances, stressing the weak-
nesses of the client's case for the sake of a greater multiplier
may adversely affect the client's interests.
Under the common fund doctrine, the potential for such
conflict does not exist. The plaintiffs' attorney first creates the
fund, then petitions the court for her fees. Hence, at all times
prior to settlement, the attorney zealously advocates her cli-
ents' case and any potential conflict between the attorney and
the class is ameliorated when the judge assumes the fiduciary
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), overruled by Save Our Cum-
berland, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)); Leubsdorf,
supra note 4, at 488-89.
This argument against risk multipliers in statutory cases does not apply
with equal force to the common fund doctrine. Applying a risk multiplier in a
common fund case will not penalize the defendant since the defendant's liabil-
ity terminates upon deposit of the settlement fund with the court. See 2 NEW-
BERG, supra note 3, § 11.11; see also Skelton, 860 F.2d at 254 n.1 (finding that in
common fund cases, "defendants' potential liability has been limited").
Although the language of the fee-shifting statutes could arguably be read
to award fees to "prevailing" defendants, fees have generally been awarded
only to prevailing plaintiffs. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1074 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has read The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act to mean that prevailing plaintiffs, and not
prevailing defendants, are entitled to recover attorneys' fees)
102. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 251.
103. The attorney receives a higher multiplier when the risk of not prevail-
ing is greatest. Thus, there is an incentive to downplay the strength of one's
own case in order to appear to have a weaker case. See e.g., Cavanagh, supra
note 40, at 91; James D. Kole, Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers: In-
centives or Windfalls?, 53 U. Cu. L. REv. 1074, 1076-77 (1986) (noting that the
lodestar system awards fees inversely proportional to the probability of
success).
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role for the class.104 Unlike the fee-shifting case where the fees
may be awarded prior to a final judgment, in the common fund
case the risk multiplier is separate from the creation of the set-
tlement fund, and becomes relevant only after the parties have
fully litigated the merits of the case.
B. DEVALUING LEGAL SERVICES: RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
BoLAR COURT'S EXTENSION.
1. Distorting the Fair Market Value of Attorney Services
Not only did the Bolar court fail to recognize the differ-
ences between the awarding of attorneys' fees under the com-
mon fund doctrine and fee-shifting statutes, but by extending
Supreme Court doctrine to eliminate risk multipliers in com-
mon fund cases, 05 the Bolar court also distorted the underlying
premise of the lodestar analysis. When the Third Circuit first
developed the lodestar equation in 1973, it found that the pur-
pose of the fee award is "to compensate the attorney for the
reasonable value of services benefiting the unrepresented
clahnant."xos6
The Bolar court erroneously found, however, that applying
City of Burlington's limitation of risk multipliers in statutory
fee cases to equitable fund cases did not defeat the purpose of
the equitable fund doctrine. Specifically, the court incorrectly
reasoned that the lodestar calculation without a risk multiplier
104. When the attorney petitions the court for her fees under the common
fund doctrine, she changes her role from that as a fiduciary of the class to a
claimant against the fund she created. See Third Circuit Task Force, supra
note 11, at 251. Unlike the fee shifting context, which retains its adversarial
nature to the end, once the defendant deposits the settlement fund with the
court in a common fund case, he has little interest or involvement in the dis-
position of the fund. See In re Continental IM., 962 F.2d at 573 (noting that
because "defendants were out of the case by virtue of their settlement ... they
had no incentive to oppose the request for fees"). Thus, the court must as-
sume the fiduciary role because it now has the responsibility of disbursing the
common fund to those supposed to benefit from it. Third Circuit Task Force,
supra note 11, at 251.
105. See Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1095.
106. Lindy I, 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973). See, e.g., In re Continental
Ill., 962 F.2d. at 572; see also MARY F. DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT
AWARDED ATTORNEY FEEs § 16.04 (1992) ("[A]ttorneys in the marketplace
properly expect greater compensation for a case in which the fee is contingent
on success than for a comparable case in which the fee is guaranteed.") (foot-
notes omitted). But cf. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal.
1990), modified, 132 F.R.D. 639 (1991) (advocating competitive bidding for posi-
tion as class counsel). This is akin to the class selling its claim on the open
attorney market.
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ensures that class counsel will receive reasonable compensa-
tion. 017 Had the court examined the underlying purpose of the
lodestar method, it would have recognized that in a contingent
case, the primary lodestar figure standing alone does not confer
the reasonable value of the attorney's services because it does
not confer the fair market value of these services, 08 unless it
compensates the attorney for the risk of not receiving any
fee.'09 Rather, to reflect accurately the fair market value, the
Bolar court should have awarded a risk multiplier to account
for the contingent nature of the case."10
In the open market, attorneys who accept contingency
cases expect greater compensation than for cases where the fee
is guaranteed."' To accurately reflect the market value of the
attorney's services, therefore, the court would need to multiply
the primary lodestar figure by a risk multiplier to compensate
the attorney for the chance of losing, thus accounting for the
contingency factor.
107. Bolar, 800 F. Supp. at 1094.
108. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 106, § 16.04 ("Because a court
awarded attorney fee should replicate the fee obtainable in the marketplace as
closely as possible, the factor of contingency of payment ... must be reflected
in the overall fee award in order to make the fee reasonable.") (footnotes
omitted). It should be noted, however, that attempting to replicate the market
value of attorney services through the lodestar calculation is a difficult en-
deavor because contingent fee arrangements usually are based on a percentage
of the dollar recovery. See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against
Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DuKE L.J. 435, 471 & n.229.
109. While it is true that the same could be said for the lodestar calculation
under the fee-shifting statutes, Congress, through the language of the Fees
Act, and the Supreme Court, through its interpretation of congressional intent
in City of Burlington, have eliminated risk multipliers based on the contin-
gency factor.
110. In a typical class action, it is not feasible to expect a true market de-
termination of a reasonable fee, because no individual class member has a
large enough interest in the litigation to negotiate a market fee with the attor-
ney. Consequently, in this situation, judges must simulate the market. See In
re Continental Ill., 962 F.2d at 572 (explaining this phenomenon).
The fair market value concept is best illustrated by an example (based on
a similar example by Judge Posner in In re Continental in., 962 F.2d at 569).
Suppose an attorney's normal billing rate is $300 per hour. If she routinely
accepts class action cases with only a 75% chance of success on a contingency
basis, simply taking her normal billing rate multiplied by the hours expended
on the case will not replicate her true value on the open market because she
will, in theory, only get paid in three out of every four cases. See DERFNER &
WOLF, supra note 106, § 16.04.
111. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 106, § 16.04.
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2. Post-Bolar: Unacceptable Options for Courts
The Bolar court not only distorts the fair market value of
the attorney's services by eliminating the risk multiplier from
fee determinations, but also leaves courts attempting to deter-
mine a reasonable fee under the lodestar method with an unac-
ceptable alternative." 2  This alternative fails to account
accurately for the reasonable value of the benefit conferred by
the attorney upon the class, or for the fair market value of the
attorney's time. Hence, if courts relied only on the primary
lodestar calculation without the benefit of a risk multiplier,
they would face significant problems.
Applying a straight hours-based formula, judges would be
less able to give attorneys accurate compensation for the bene-
fit conferred on the class. If attorneys negotiate a settlement
112. Notwithstanding Bolar, courts usually award fees using the lodestar
with enhancements method, the percentage of recovery method, or a combina-
tion of the two where the court calculates the lodestar and compares it as a
percentage of the total fund or vice versa. Compare Weinberger v. Great N.
Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp. 804, 811-12 (D. Me. 1992) (calculated fees using the
lodestar method) with In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Pro-
gram Litig., 736 F. Supp. 1007, 1016 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (choosing percentage of re-
covery method) and In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 771 F.
Supp. 284, 287 & n.9 (D. Minn. 1991) (using percentage of recovery method but
checking the award total against the enhanced lodestar calculation).
The hybrid method used in In re Workers' Compensation Insurance be-
comes virtually useless because, according to Bolar, the primary lodestar
should not be adjusted. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec. Litig., 800 F.
Supp. at 1097. This hybrid method differs from the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in the 1980s, whereby the Court calculated the primary load-
star and then enhanced that figure based on the Johnson factors.
After Bolar, courts may determine fees using the percentage of recovery
method. The Lindy I court criticized the percentage of recovery method be-
cause it produced arbitrary fee awards and failed to account accurately for at-
torneys' efforts. The problems inherent in the percentage of recovery method
still exist today. Percentage awards remain random and judges rarely include
detailed reasons for the percentage chosen. See, e.g., In re Chrysler Motors
Corp., 736 F. Supp at 1016 (granting an award of 17.5% of the fund and stating
that "[t]his percentage is well within the normal range of fees when consid-
ered in terms of the relative size of the fund"); see also supra note 35 (describ-
ing the range of fee awards under the percentage of recovery method). For an
excellent analysis of the problems inherent with the percentage of recovery
method, see Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 23-24. Yet, as the Bolar deci-
sion illustrates, inconsistent lodestar jurisprudence leads to a renascence of the
percentage method with more and more courts returning to some form of the
percentage method in common fund cases. See In re Chrysler Motors Corp.,
736 F. Supp. at 1013 (listing cases applying a new hybrid of the percentage of
recovery method); see also Lapointe, supra note 36, at 863 ("[C]ourts that had
become frustrated with the vagaries of the lodestar method abandoned it en-
tirely and instead adopted the percentage-of-recovery approach to common
fund fee awards.").
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fairly early in the case, for example, the benefit conferred on
the class may be substantial but the compensation under the
lodestar will be relatively small.113 Conversely, if the attorney
works numerous hours but only confers a small benefit to the
class, a rigid application of the lodestar analysis would dispro-
portionately reward the attorney and contravene the common
fund doctrine's premise of avoiding unjust enrichment.
Additionally, sole reliance on the primary lodestar calcula-
tion provides little incentive for attorneys to accept contingent
fee common fund cases. Attorneys would probably not take
common fund cases over a cases where the client paid the same
hourly-rate fee regardless of the outcome. Although the Bolar
court noted that "[d]ozens of New York City's top law firms
vied for the opportunity" to represent the plaintiff class," 4 the
finding actually supports the appropriateness of granting a risk
multiplier. The number of attorneys willing to accept a case di-
rectly relates to their market expectations, including the expec-
tation of a risk multiplier." 5 If the risk multiplier accurately
reflects the fair market value of the litigation, attorneys will
willingly accept the case. Without a risk multiplier, however,
market forces would prevent most lawyers from accepting con-
tingent class action law suits. Hence, the Bolar court's reliancd
on the primary lodestar not only compensates the attorney for
less than her market value, but also reduces the number of po-
tential future plaintiffs by eliminating attorneys' incentive to
accept contingent class actions.
Attorneys who receive an enhanced fee for contingent
work do not receive a windfall on top of a reasonable fee."
6
113. If, for example, attorneys quickly generated a settlement fund of
$30,000,000 and only received a lodestar fee of $30,000, they would receive only
0.1% of the total fund. By contrast, if the attorneys only generated a fund of
$50,000 but received a lodestar fee $30,000, they would receive 60% of the fund.
In the former scenario, the class members receive a windfall; in the latter situ-
ation, the attorney receives a windfall. Actual unjust enrichment also depends
on other factors such as the number of people benefitted by the class. On this
point, see, for example, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
114. In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec. Litig., 800 F. Supp 1091, 1097
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
115. Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 53 (noting that "some trial courts
conclude that if a particular case attracted numerous attorneys, the case could
not have been particularly risky," and pointing out the fallacy of this conclu-
sion because "the number of attorneys in a case is a function of their reason-
able expectations-including their expectations of obtaining a risk multiplier if
the suit is successful").
116. NEWBERG, supra note 35, § 1.08; see also DERFNER & WOLF, supra note
106, § 16.04(4)(a).
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Rather, they receive what the market would pay them accord-
ing to an hourly rate regardless of outcome. In the contingent
context, attorneys bear the risk of loss by investing time, effort,
opportunity costs, and the present value of compensation with
no guarantee of receiving payment promptly or at all.117 The
client ultimately benefits from a system which creates an in-
centive for attorneys to take cases under the contingency
model. Without the incentive, the client would be effectively
shut out of the judicial process and would lose an opportunity
to enjoy the benefit of the class action.
With some minor reform, the primary lodestar method,
coupled with risk multipliers and settlement incentives, could
align attorneys' fee determinations with the lodestar's basic
purpose: reasonably to compensate attorneys for the benefit
they have conferred on the absent claimants.
C. GETTING BACK TO BASICS: REFORMATION OF THE
LODESTAR WITH ITS UNDERLYING PURPOSE IN MIND
The Bolar decision further complicated the already confus-
ing question of how to award reasonable attorneys' fees in the
common fund context. Due to inconsistent application of the
lodestar and accompanying enhancements, courts are looking
elsewhere for guidance in determining reasonable fees.118
Properly applied, risk multipliers and multipliers used to re-
ward early settlement can return the lodestar method once
again to the forefront of fee award determinations.119
1. Communication and Pre-Determination: The Key to Less
Conflict in Assessing the Risk
All of the parties involved must communicate from the
outset in order to determine properly the level of risk in a class
117. See generally NEWBERG, supra note 35, § 1.08 (outlining the risks at-
torneys take in accepting contingent class action suits).
118. See, e.g., In re Chrysler Motors Corp., 736 F. Supp. at 1015-16 (re-jecting the lodestar calculation as unpredictable and awarding fees based on a
percentage of the fund recovered).
119. To be truly effective, the risk multiplier must consider both the un-
derlying reason for the lodestar method (to make fee awards more accountable
upon scrutiny) and the underlying purpose of the method (to compensate the
attorney for the reasonable value of services benefitting the unrepresented
claimant). Proper use of the risk multiplier could address the concerns of
commentators who criticize the lodestar method, and could make the calcula-
tion of a reasonable fee much less arduous. This would be accomplished by
adhering to three key concepts of risk multipliers: communication and prede-
termination, consistent risk multiplier awards, and settlement incentives.
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action contingency suit. Commentators continually criticize the
present risk multiplier assessment because its ex post judicial
determinations of risk lack accuracy. 2 0  Although courts
should look at the risk factor as of the time the attorney ac-
cepted the case,' 2 1 the determination is difficult to make
months or even years after the inception of the lawsuit. Pre-
determination of the risk and communication of these findings
between the class attorneys, the class, and the court, can sub-
stantially eliminate this problem by adhering to an ex ante de-
termination of risk by the plaintiff's counsel.
Under this proposal,2 2 when the named plaintiff first ap-
proaches the attorney, or more realistically, when the attorney
seeks out the named plaintiff, the attorney would complete a
risk assessment study in which she would examine the case for
the possible risk factor. Factors to consider include comparison
with similar cases,2 3 the defendant's reaction to the potential
suit,2A possible criminal investigations occurring simultane-
ously with the proposed class action,25 and any other relevant
information such as the attorney's prior experience in this type
120. See Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 53 (noting possible hindsight
bias with the use of the current ex ante perspective); see also Leubsdorf, supra
note 4, at 487 ("One may question whether a judge should be called upon to
look for the dust swept under the same rug on which he is standing."). Com-
mentators also argue that assessing one risk multiplier at the beginning of the
lawsuit fails to recognize the different levels of risk present throughout the
lawsuit, suggesting that courts should assess different risk multipliers at dif-
ferent stages of the lawsuit. See Dobbs, supra note 108, at 470. The risk multi-
plier, however, is designed to compensate the attorney for the risk at the
inception of the lawsuit. Adjusting the multiplier for each stage of the lawsuit
distorts the risk the attorney bore to initiate the lawsuit in the first place.
121. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy I").
122. This proposal simply suggests how better to use risk multipliers in
common fund cases. A number of other commentators have also developed
proposals for dealing with the problem of fee awards. See, e.g., Leubsdorf,
supra note 4, at 511 (suggesting that the court should award a risk multiplier
of two in all contingency cases); Miller & Macey, supra note 40, at 57-58 (sug-
gesting the court appoint a special master to assess the fee under the lodestar
method); Silver, supra note 40, at 901-07 (recommending that the parties de-
termine the fee arrangement up front and that a "taxing magistrate" handle
any disputes).
123. If a case is virtually identical to prior cases, the attorney can look at
the success rates of the other cases to evaluate the risk with a reasonable de-
gree of certainty. See Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117 (listing factors that go into risk
assessment.)
124. The situation in which the defendant zealously denies all allegations
presents a greater risk that the plaintiff class will not prevail than the case in
which defendant admits some wrongdoing at the beginning. See id.
125. If the government has taken the time to investigate possible wrongdo-
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of case.' 26 After completing the risk analysis, the attorney
should inform the class members of the potential for risk in
round percentiles (within five to ten percent)2 7 through a di-
rect mailing to the prospective class.i 2s
After informing the class, the attorney should file her risk
assessment, including detailed findings, with the court. If the
lawsuit reaches settlement, the judge should examine the risk
assessment and award the appropriate multiplier listed below.
The attorney risk assessment would create the ceiling for the
final risk determination by the court,2 9 subject to downward
adjustment if the judge perceives an abuse of discretion in in-
flating the risk factor. The threat of downward adjustment
would give the attorney an incentive to determine the risk as
accurately as possible.' 30 If the judge deviates greatly from the
attorney risk assessment, however, the judge would have to
make specific findings and place them in the record to expedite
the case should the parties appeal the fee award.
2. Consistency: The Key to Uniform Application of and Less
Litigation Over Risk Multipliers
As explained above, absent a risk multiplier, attorneys who
accept common fund cases on a contingency basis receive less
than the fair market value of their services. Consequently,
courts must award a risk multiplier in all contingency fee cases
because the very nature of a contingent case precludes a one-
hundred percent guarantee of successful settlement. One solu-
tion to the inconsistent application of risk multipliers is to ap-
ply the same risk multiplier for all risk within a specific range.
ing, the likelihood that the defendant has violated the class members' rights is
greater.
126. See Lindy I, 540 F.2d at 117.
127. This Comment selected round percentiles because of the inherent dif-
ficulty in calculating the exact percent chance of non-recovery. See DERFNER
& WOLF, supra note 106, § 16.04(b)(i) ("Pinpointing the degree of risk is an in-
herently difficult task that poses substantial problems for all involved.")
128. See generally 2 NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 8 (detailing the process of
notifying class members).
129. The attorney should assess the maximum risk involved because she
has better information than the court and because she has the most at stake in
assessing the risk. This would also eliminate the need for judges to raise the
risk factor, thus theoretically streamlining the process.
130. Allowing the judge to lower the risk assessment for abuse of discre-
tion greatly reduces the possibility that the attorneys will pad the risk assess-
ment. Moreover, because the judge would not see the risk assessment until
after the merits have been litigated, the process would avoid conflicts of inter-
est between the attorney and the class.
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This proposal would also eliminate a great deal of litigation by
class members disgruntled over the size of the multiplier.
Under this proposal, cases would fall within one of five cat-
egories of risk multipliers: 31 those with a risk factor (i.e. the
chance of not prevailing) less than fifteen percent, those with a
risk factor between fifteen percent and thirty percent, those
with a risk factor between thirty percent and sixty percent,
those with a risk factor between sixty percent and eighty per-
cent, and those with a risk factor greater than eighty per-
cent. 32 For each category, the court assesses a fixed risk
multiplier representing the approximate mean risk factor. 33
After assessing the appropriate risk multiplier and multiplying
131. This proposal is somewhat analogous to Justice O'Connor's suggestion
in Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 732-33 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment). She proposed that courts treat all contingency
as a class, awarding consistent fee determinations based on the way the rele-
vant market treats contingent cases. Id at 733. Justice Blackmun also
adopted this line of reasoning in his opinion in City of Burlington v. Dague,
112 S. Ct. 2638, 2645-46 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although the major-
ity of the Supreme Court rejected this proposal in City of Burlington, com-
mentators have supported this class proposal for contingency cases. See, e.g.,
Leubsdorf, supra, note 4, at 501. Unfortunately, awarding a consistent risk
multiplier would do little to provide attorneys with an incentive to accept
those cases with a greater risk. If an attorney knows that she will get, for ex-
ample, a 15% enhancement in a contingent case regardless of the actual risk
involved, she should be reluctant to accept any cases with less than an 85%
probability of success, and eager to accept cases with a greater than 85%
probability of success. To create incentives for attorneys to accept cases and to
reasonably compensate them for their fair market value, the risk multiplier
must remain consistent with the actual risk involved.
132. One of the leading criticisms of risk multipliers is the presumption
that the higher the multiplier, the greater the encouragement for attorneys to
bring nonmeritorious suits. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 26
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), overruled by Save Our
Cuberland, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), the court
gave the example that if a case had a two percent chance of success, the risk
multiplier would be 50 (1/.02 = 50). Id. Consequently, an attorney could
bring 50 nonmeritorious suits, only prevail on one, and be even. The court
reasoned that this would bog down the judiciary and choke off legitimate suits.
Id. at 27. The argument miscalculates the situation for three reasons: First,
regardless of the size of the multiplier, in order to get paid, the case must re-
sult in a common fund. Second, procedural mechanisms weed out nonmerito-
rious litigation. See, e.g. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (providing for sanctions against
lawyers who fail to act in good faith); FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(b)(6) (motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings for "failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted"). Third, the tremendous costs that the attorneys must
bear in bringing those 49 unsuccessful suits would likely sink all but the most
affluent law firms. In short, if the attorney succeeds in a case with a two per-
cent chance of success, she should be compensated for the fair market value of
her efforts.
133. The risk multipliers break down as follows:
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it by the primary lodestar figure,'3 the trial court then com-
pares the enhanced lodestar figure against its percentage of the
total fund in order to assure that the fee award comports with
the unjust enrichment principle on which the common fund
doctrine rests.'3 5
Consistent application of a fee award scheme such as the
one proposed would make fee determinations more uniform
and, consequently, leave less room for litigating the size of the
fee award. Moreover, this proposal would eliminate criticism
that judges often "shoot from the hip," when using the lode-
star, creating confusion and uncertainty.136
3. Multipliers as Incentives: Encouraging Early Settlement
Courts could also use settlement multipliers as incentives
to address other criticisms of the lodestar and to encourage at-
torneys to accept class action suits. A primary criticism leveled
against the use of the lodestar is that attorneys often pad hours
because the lodestar provides no incentive for an early resolu-
tion of the case. A system of settlement multipliers addresses
this criticism and ultimately encourages attorneys to seek more
readily early settlement if the best interest of the litigation
calls for settlement.L37
This proposal breaks the trial down into three stages: pre-
RISK FACTOR RANGE RISK MULTIPLIER BASED ON RiSK % OF
1) 0 - 15% risk 1.17 15% (85% success)
2) 16 - 30% risk 1.33 25% (75% success)
3) 31 - 60% risk 1.82 45% (55% success)
4) 61 - 80% risk 3.33 70% (30% success)
5) > 81% risk 10.00 90% (10% success)
134. This is the lodestar figure developed by the Third Circuit in 1973.
135. Checking the result against the percentage of recovery guarantees
that the award will be reasonable in light of the common fund doctrine, yet
provides a more accurate picture of the effort expended by the attorney than
the percentage method alone. If the enhanced lodestar amount greatly ex-
ceeds the percentage caps set forth below, the judge should reduce the award
accordingly.
Under this proposal, the enhanced lodestar should not exceed the follow-
ing percentages of the total fund:
PERCENTAGE OF ENHANCED
SIZE OF FUND LODESTAR
* $1,000,000 not to exceed 35%
> $1M but < $1OM not to exceed 30%
> $10,000,000 not to exceed 25%
These percentages reflect the court's usual notions of just enrichment
under the common fund doctrine.
136. See Silver, supra note 40, at 950.
137. The settlement enhancements break down as follows:
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discovery, post-discovery, and pre-trial. By awarding the appro-
priate multiplier for each stage at which the case is settled,
courts will encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to seek this alterna-
tive and ultimately save valuable judicial resources. 138 Courts
would add the settlement enhancement to the risk enhance-
ment and arrive at the final fee determination. This proposal
would give attorneys an incentive to settle without providing so
great a windfall that it promotes improper settlements. Again,
to remain consistent with the equity rationale of the common
fund doctrine, the enhanced lodestar figure must remain consis-
tent with the percentage caps listed above.' 3 9
CONCLUSION
In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. found risk multipliers inap-
propriate in a common fund case, and thus improperly ex-
tended the Supreme Court's restriction on risk multipliers. In
failing to recognize the purpose and effect of common fund fee
awards and the fair market value of attorneys' services, the Bo-
AMOUNT OF
TIME OF SETTLEMENT ENHANCEMENT MULTIPLIER
Pre-discovery 25% of primary lodestar 1.25
Post-discovery 15% of primary lodestar 1.15
On the eve of trial 10% of primary lodestar 1.10
138. It should be stressed that this proposal only encourages settlement if
it is in the best interest of the class. Often, the class would be better served by
an equitable remedy rather than a damage remedy. In these cases, the class
attorney should forgo the lure of the settlement enhancement and concentrate
on the interests of her clients.
For a cautionary work regarding settlement, see Fiss, supra note 101, at
1075, characterizing settlement as the "civil analogue of plea bargaining."
139. The facts of Bolar illustrate how this proposal would operate. The
court found that the hourly rate for attorneys ($300) and paralegals ($60) mul-
tiplied by the total hours worked (7,846.3) resulted in a primary lodestar of
$1,469,809.00. See supra note 68. The Bolar court initially awarded a risk mul-
tiplier of 1.6, reflecting a 62.5% chance of success (1/RM = % of success).
Under this proposal, the court would award a risk multiplier of 3.33 (since the
risk factor falls within the 61-80% range) for an enhanced lodestar of
$4,894,463.90. Because the case settled just prior to the completion of virtually
all discovery, [Proposed] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order With
Respect to Award of Lodestar Multiplier to Plaintiffs' Counsel 14(e), In re
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., Sec. Litig., 800 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(No. 89 Civ. 1726) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review), the court would
also award a settlement enhancement multiplier of 1.15. This would add
$220,471.35 ($1,469,809.00 x .15) to the enhanced lodestar for a final fee award
of $5,114,935.20. This figure represents approximately 16.3% of the
$31,375,000.00 settlement fund. Because the fee award cannot exceed 25% of a
fund of that size, the award of $5,114,935.20 would be appropriate under this
proposal.
[Vol. 77:893
1993] ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARDS 923
lar court relied on a misguided and problematic rationale to
prohibit a risk multiplier in the common fund context.
Notwithstanding Bolar, courts should award risk multipliers in
common fund actions and adopt a consistent approach to using
the risk multiplier that will enhance its effectiveness, reduce
the amount of litigation surrounding its use, and ultimately en-
courage a willingness on the part of attorneys to accept contin-
gent fee common fund cases.

